Introduction
The concept of hegemony can be used to examine three phases in the development of European broadcasting. Beginning in the 1920s, the first phase was characterized by the appearance of public broadcasting monopolies. Through public broadcasting, a number of nation-states in Europe attempted to secure hegemony over their territory. The second phase, which took shape during the 1980s, involved the collapse of the public broadcasting monopolies and the emergence of private broadcasting in many European countries. Private companies started trying to establish their hegemony in relation to broadcasting. The 1990s brought digital broadcasting and the onset of a third phase (Kleinsteuber, 1998: 72) . Although there may be some public involvement with digital broadcasting, digital services are largely emerging under private auspices. As a result, the hegemonic process that began during the 1980s will likely deepen.
Under historical and contemporary conditions, how can the issue of hegemony in the European broadcasting context be analysed? The present article suggests that useful insights can be gleaned from the Canadian experience. To this end, the article has two objectives. The first objective is to show that there have been historical (and growing) similarities between broadcasting issues in Canada and Europe. Building on these similarities, the second objective is to demonstrate how a theoretical model that has been used to examine struggles for hegemony through Canadian broadcasting policy debates may also be applicable in the European context. The model to be addressed considers hegemony in relation to the role of three discourses on communication technologies. These discourses are technological determinism, technological democracy and technological nationalism. The prevalence of all three discourses in policy discussions about broadcasting has been one of the similarities between Canada and Europe. However, there have been two significant gaps in academic references to the discourses. First, many studies of communication issues have looked at one or possibly two of the discourses rather than all three and the relationships among them. In Canada, for example, Charland (1986) focused on technological nationalism while Mosco (1989) analysed technological determinism and technological democracy. On the other side of the Atlantic, technological determinism has been the only discourse to be discussed by some researchers (e.g. Williams, 1975; Preston, 2001) . A second and more important gap has been generated by the tendency to examine the discourses only in relation to the arguments of powerful, dominant agents. For instance, Babe (1990) linked the positions of private companies and the federal government in Canada to technological determinism or technological nationalism. Similarly, Collins (1998) associated technological determinism with policy set out by the European Commission. The exclusive focus on how the discourses are woven into the positions and policy statements of powerful national and supranational agents may have served the purposes of these researchers, but it has left some intriguing issues unexplored; it is not clear how less powerful, subordinate agents (such as various social movements) have responded to the discourses. The theoretical model put forth here attempts to correct both of these gaps by linking all three of the discourses to struggles between dominant and subordinate agents.
Discourses on communication technologies
Before getting to the model, it is necessary to begin with an overview of the three discourses. This overview makes some theoretical points about technological determinism, technological democracy and technological nationalism. Addressing both Canada and Europe, the overview also offers a brief comparative analysis of how the three discourses have been tied to historical and contemporary broadcasting issues.
One of these issues is the development of private broadcasting. Private broadcasting began in Canada long before it appeared in most European countries. Canada had a 'mixed' system of public and private broadcasting in place by the 1930s, but such a system only became common in Europe during the 1980s. Corporate interests in broadcasting, and the efforts of government to assist these interests, were therefore apparent much earlier in Canada than in Europe. This had implications for technological determinism.
Technological determinism
Technological determinism is a discourse which holds that communication technologies foster social transformation (Mosco, 1989: 70) . The discourse has been utilized by dominant agents such as private companies, governments and supranational institutions. As Babe (1990: 18) notes, the discourse is useful to such agents since 'technological causation' provides a justification for 'deregulation'. However, Babe stresses that 'deregulation' (or any other regulatory change) enhances the rights of some while reducing the rights of others. He concludes that 'one should speak only of "reregulation". This latter term affords proper emphasis to government's role of apportioning and reapportioning relative rights and freedoms among contending interests' (Babe, 1990: 245) . Government obscures its role in apportioning privilege, structuring markets and converging industries (all of which is done on behalf of private industry). It does so through technological determinism, asserting that technology is responsible for such developments (Babe, 1990: 245) . Technological determinism is therefore ideologically significant in relation to the marketization of broadcasting, including the general reorientation of intervention from the public interest to corporate interests (Murdock, 2000: 39-41) .
Technological determinism has long played a role in relation to Canadian broadcasting policy. The growing role of private sector activity in broadcasting during the 1960s set the stage for the discourse. In 1969, 'broadcasting' became subsumed under the federal government's economic and industrial focus on 'communications'. However, rather than being justified in terms of free enterprise, 'the ideological basis on which the Department of Communications was to be launched was technological determinism' (Raboy, 1990: 193) . Through this discourse, the Department was seen as responding to developments in communication technologies rather than the corporate interests associated with the technologies. From the early 1970s to the late 1980s, the Department released many policy documents that expressed the discourse of technological determinism (Babe, 1990: 11-13) . One document was 1971's Instant World, which addressed the issue of convergence between broadcasting and telecommunications almost two decades before the issue generally received policy attention (Fraser, 2002: 313) . Another document, 1983's Towards a New National Broadcasting Policy, utilized the technological context as a vehicle of legitimation for further private development of broadcasting (Raboy, 1990: 287) .
As a discourse and a component of broadcasting policy discussions, technological determinism appears to have generally developed later in Europe than in Canada. The widespread appearance of private broadcasting in Europe during the 1980s coincided with the growth of the discourse. Sussman (1997: 23) notes that, within the capitalist states of the world, technological determinism was 'an ideological theme and language that gained currency in the 1980s'. Focusing on the European context, Preston (2001: 1, 6 ) argues that it was not fashionable in the 1970s to admire information and communication technologies. This changed in the 1980s, and the new view was accompanied by a perception of the technologies 'as powerful forces which are propelling us into entirely "new times"' (Preston, 2001: 2) . Such technological determinism was initially associated with the rhetoric and neoliberal policies of Britain's Thatcher government in the early 1980s (Preston, 2001: 24-5) . However, technological determinism also soon appeared in the broadcasting and audiovisual policies of the European Community (Collins, 1998: 23-4) .
During the 1990s, technological determinism continued to play a role in Canada and Europe through policy documents about various issues associated with the 'information society' or the 'digital age'. Several analysts have noted the existence of technological determinism in policy studies or reports about convergence (Skogerbø, 1998: 55-6; Winseck, 1998: 343) . Technological determinism has also informed much of the writing about digitalization in reports by corporations, governments and commercial consultants (Murdock, 2000: 39) . The discourses associated with the 'information society' still mask the central role of the state in funding or supporting technological developments (Preston, 2001: 178, 206) . All of these points can be illustrated through reference to a few policy documents that have been released over the last several years. In Canada, the Information Highway Advisory Council (IHAC) identified 'information and communications technologies as key agents in the far reaching changes that are overtaking every society on earth' (Canada, 1997: 1) . Similarly, the European Commission (1999b: 5) indicated that 'digital technology is already bringing about important social, cultural and educational changes and will bring about even greater changes in the future'. Babe (1988: 60) notes that such statements 'posit technology to be active and humans to be passive, implying that at best one can only adapt in order to survive'. Thus, there was an emphasis on the need for policy and legislation to adapt to technology (principally by relaxing regulations or otherwise creating favourable conditions for private industry). A report on the 'information society' that was prepared by the Canadian Radio-Television and Telecommunications Commission (CRTC), a regulatory agency, stressed that 'what remains essential is the continued application of licensing criteria specifically adapted to the new emerging services and technologies' (Canada, 1995: 35) . The European Commission (1999b: 5) made a similar point: 'The audiovisual sector is undergoing major changes as a result of the introduction of digital technologies, changes which will very likely require the adaptation of both the regulatory framework and the various national and Community support mechanisms in this sector.'
Technological democracy
Technological determinism provides the foundation for the discourse of technological democracy. The latter suggests that communication technologies enable participation, access, control, equality, freedom, choice, etc. (Mosco, 1989: 71) . Like technological determinism, technological democracy is a discourse in the arguments of dominant agents. It is especially apparent in the positions of private companies. Technological democracy also resembles technological determinism in that it too is ideologically tied to the marketization of broadcasting, including liberalization and regulatory change that benefits corporate interests.
The prevalence of technological democracy in Canadian broadcasting policy debates has much to do with the early development of cable television and community broadcasting. Introduced to Canada in the early 1950s, cable television grew rapidly in popularity during the 1960s and 1970s. During this period, Canada had the highest cable penetration rate in the world (Smythe, 1981: 183) . The early 1970s saw cable television become a key basis for supplying community broadcasting in Canada. Within this context, the discourse of technological democracy started to appear in the arguments of private cable companies. The Canadian Cable Television Association (CCTA) utilized the discourse in a brief that it presented during 1971. As quoted by Raboy (1990: 212) , the CCTA's brief emphasized themes such as 'public access' through community channels and 'viewer choice' through the proliferation of channels. Raboy (1990: 212) concluded that 'the cable companies had appealed to the dream of technological democracy'. The same discourse and themes continued to circulate in the arguments of cable companies well into the 1980s.
Technological democracy has also played a role on the other side of the Atlantic, and this is at least partially because cable television and community broadcasting in Europe were influenced by Canadian developments. The arrival of cable television was linked to expectations about 'a new golden age of "teledemocracy"' (Golding, 1998a: 143) . The possibilities of community channels were emphasized, and the development of these channels was affected by earlier developments in Canada. The CRTC, Canada's broadcasting regulator, issued successive policy statements on community broadcasting that had an impact in Europe (Prehn, 1992: 256) . Furthermore, Quebec's model of community broadcasting was influential in France as well as the French-speaking community of Belgium (Lafrance and Simon, 1992: 170; Drijvers, 1992a: 112) . In the 1980s, even Canadian cable companies had an impact on
community channels in Europe; Maclean Hunter saw the low penetration rate of cable in Britain as a good opportunity for expansion, and the firm drew upon its experience in using local and community channels as a marketing tool (Gray and Lewis, 1992: 163-4) . It seems, then, that the same discourse and themes which Canadian cable companies had utilized in Canada since the 1970s were used later in Europe during the 1980s. At the same time, one of the themes in the discourse of technological democracy started to play an important role for other reasons: 'consumer choice' became a central issue as cable became wrapped up in neoliberal arguments (King, 1998: 282) .
The discourse of technological democracy has more recently been tied to discussions about the 'information society'. The earlier claims made about democracy through radio, television, cable and community television have been joined by the current claims made about the Internet (Jankowski and van Selm, 2000: 150) . As van Dijk and Hacker (2000: 220) note, the nature of these claims has remained the same: 'Strong advocates of digital democracy, teledemocracy, cyberdemocracy and the like hailed the blessings of the new technology and welcomed it as a technology of freedom.' Furthermore, technological democracy has been associated with arguments for adjustments to regulation that benefit private industry. The public consultations in Europe pertaining to the Green Paper on convergence revealed that business, the information technology and Internet industries and many telecommunications operators believed that the nature or weight of regulation 'should take account of the way in which new services and technologies empower the consumer and the citizen, enabling them to make more informed choices about the services and information they receive' (European Commission, 1998a: 23) .
Technological nationalism
The discourse of technological nationalism can be constructed in two ways. On the one hand, like technological democracy, the discourse may be based on technological determinism. This is implied by Charland (1986: 197) , who indicates that technological nationalism 'ascribes to technology the capacity to create a nation by enhancing communication'. On the other hand, the discourse may be rooted in human agency. According to Babe (1990: 9) , technological nationalism suggests that people have 'purposefully deployed systems of communication for nationbuilding'. The discourse is rarely found in the arguments of private
companies, but it has frequently been taken up by other dominant agents (most typically national governments).
In Canada, the discourse of technological nationalism has had two key elements. The first element involves the external threat of the United States, and the second element focuses on the internal problem of national unity. The discourse assigns to technological means of communication, especially public broadcasting, the task of contending with these two challenges to Canada's existence. Canada has had a 'tradition of technological nationalism' (Fraser, 2002: 313) , and the discourse has usually been rooted in human agency. All of this is evident from speeches that Prime Minister R.B. Bennett gave in the 1930s prior to the emergence of public broadcasting through the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (CBC). Bennett emphasized the role of human agency when he stated that, 'properly employed, the radio can be made a most effective instrument in nation-building' (quoted in Raboy, 1990: 39) . He also set out the two elements of technological nationalism in relation to public broadcasting. Bennett indicated the need for 'complete Canadian control of broadcasting from Canadian sources, free from foreign interference or influence'. Through this control, 'national consciousness may be fostered and sustained and national unity still further strengthened' (quoted in Raboy, 1990: 45-6) . While technological nationalism has been associated with national unity, it has also been associated with undermining regional and cultural differences. Roth and Valaskakis (1989: 229) note that 'Canadian government communications discourses have traditionally been structured around the promotion of a common culture with explicitly national objectives'. Regional and cultural differences have been acknowledged, but 'a broad strategy to constitute a national identity has been based on the assumption that these disparities can be surmounted by extension of technology to remote areas and disenfranchised minorities'.
Technological nationalism is also evident in Europe, but the discourse went down a unique path of development and has only recently come to feature both of the elements that have been present in Canada for decades. As in Canada, public broadcasting in Europe began with a focus on ensuring national unity and reducing regional or ethnic divisions (van den Bulck, 2001: 56-7) . Drijvers (1992b: 195) indicates that a number of European countries tried to bind together the diverse groups within their geographic borders through public broadcasting, and 'the price paid for this "national unity" has been in most cases the suppression of the cultural identities of different indigenous communities'. This describes the historical circumstances in a number of European countries, including Britain (Scannell, 1995: 26-7) . However, unlike the case in Canada, the discourse of technological nationalism also extended beyond the nationstate and became rooted in technological determinism. In the 1980s, the European Community began to pursue what Preston (2001: 233) describes as a 'technology-centred social engineering project aimed at constructing a new Euro-person identity to diminish or replace the established role of national identity formations'. As Collins (1996: 237-8, 247) notes, this project emphasized the role of satellite broadcasting in fostering 'a collective European cultural identity' as well as 'European unity'. While a 'technological supranationalism' emerged in Europe, the historical development of the discourse also departed from the Canadian case in another way. The threat of Americanization had been a key element of the discourse in discussions of Canadian broadcasting since the 1930s (due to Canada's proximity to the US and the spillover of American broadcasting signals), but this element of the discourse only began to play a prominent role in European arguments about broadcasting during the 1980s. This can be attributed to several key developments, including the growth of private broadcasting and importation of American television programmes (de Bens and de Smaele, 2001: 52) as well as the spread of transnational television in Europe through communications satellites (Chalaby, 2002: 185-7) . Furthermore, these concerns about Americanization went beyond the national level to form part of a technological supranationalism. As Schlesinger (2001: 103) indicates, 'the role of audiovisual media in constructing a European identity has been officially defined in opposition to a culturally invasive Other, namely the United States'.
The discourse of technological nationalism is still present in the 'digital age'. It has been used to justify a role for public broadcasting on the 'information highway'. In Canada, the CRTC stated that 'the highway links past achievements in communications to future aspirations. . . . Throughout Canada's history, policy makers have seen the importance of communications to economic and cultural sovereignty, and have fought to build roadways that link all parts of this country' (Canada, 1995: 5) . One of these roadways is the CBC, and policy reports have argued that the CBC can continue to play a role in the digital era. For example, the IHAC suggested that the CBC could assist 'in meeting the need for distinctively Canadian content on the Information Highway' (Canada, 1997: 67) . The European Commission (1999b: 12) has similarly noted that 'public service television plays an important role in the Member States of the European Community', and it has called for 'the integration of public service broadcasting in the new digital audiovisual environment'. Harrison and Woods (2001: 483) indicate that the Community still sees public broadcasting as important since mass audience programming generates 'a shared sense of community, which may provide a sense of social cohesion and belonging. . . . The implication is that a sense of interconnectedness may be vital at a time when audiences are fragmenting.' Even during the digital era, public broadcasting is regarded as being crucial for holding people together and reflecting their identity.
The discourses and two forms of hegemony
The preceding analysis has shown that the positions of dominant agents in historical or contemporary broadcasting policy debates are often linked to three discourses on communication technologies. The arguments of private companies, governments and supranational institutions have frequently been based on technological determinism, technological democracy or technological nationalism. However, it is important to keep in mind that these arguments may be challenged by social movements and other subordinate agents. The struggles between dominant and subordinate agents are central to a theoretical model that is proposed here for examining historical, contemporary or even future conflicts over broadcasting policy. This theoretical model links the role of the discourses in broadcasting policy debates to some theoretical ideas about hegemony and the state.
A detailed discussion of hegemony is beyond the scope of the present article, but five points need to be made about this complex concept and the way it ties into an analysis of discourses on communication technologies. First, hegemony has economic, political and ideological aspects. Non-ideological aspects of hegemony were recognized by Gramsci (1971: 161) , and they were stressed by Jessop et al. (1988: 43) when discussing Thatcherism. Second, following the general approach of Gramsci and the analysis of Thatcherism presented by Hall (1988a Hall ( , 1988b , the focus here is on the ideological aspects of hegemony. Although it is important to recognize that hegemony is not exclusively an ideological phenomenon (Hall, 1988a: 156) , the more modest goal of this article is to address the role of discourses on communication technologies with regard to the hegemony of dominant agents. Third, it must also be noted that hegemony is never completely achieved; it is constantly in the process of being secured, partially through discourses which aim to win the consent of subordinate agents. Fourth, hegemony is always contested through alternative and oppositional discourses (Hall, 1988a: 7; Hackett et al., 1996: 259) . Fifth, and lastly, it is useful to address discourses on communication technologies in relation to different
forms of hegemony. The inspiration for such an approach stems from a distinction that Jessop (1990: 8) makes between a 'hegemonic project' and a 'state project'. Jessop (1990: 8) contends that it is necessary to analytically separate 'the state's potential role in unifying a society divided by classes' and 'the sort of political hegemony involved in securing the substantial institutional unity of the capitalist type of state'. It is possible, then, to address corporate hegemony and state hegemony.
Corporate hegemony
The hegemony of private capital is connected to a hegemonic project. Jessop (1990: 161) sees a hegemonic project in terms of 'the mobilization of support behind a concrete, national-popular programme of action which asserts a general interest in the pursuit of objectives that, explicitly or implicitly, advance the long-term interest of the hegemonic class (fraction)'. Drawing on aspects of Jessop's concept and applying them to broadcasting issues, it can be suggested that a wider project of neoliberal economic reform undertaken by a state or a supranational institution (such as the European Union) is assisted by efforts to establish general interests in a free market approach to broadcasting and the hegemony of private capital in broadcasting. The private sector long ago replaced the public sector as the dominant force in Canadian broadcasting, and a similar situation has been emerging in a number of European countries over the past few decades. However, for private capital to enjoy hegemony in broadcasting, the role and expansion of the private sector require popular support. It may be useful to outline the key agents that are connected to the struggle for corporate hegemony in Canada and Europe.
In Canada, the struggle for corporate hegemony has involved a number of dominant and subordinate agents. Since at least the 1960s, when the private sector began to assume the dominant position in Canadian broadcasting (Pike, 1995: 56) , the dominant agents have included private companies with interests in broadcasting and cable. They were joined in the 1980s by private firms involved with telecommunications, satellites and independent production. These dominant agents have utilized the discourses of technological determinism and technological democracy in the process of establishing their hegemony. The discourses have also been utilized by other dominant agents, the Liberal and Progressive Conservative governments which have (over the years) assisted corporate agents connected to broadcasting. The
challenges to corporate hegemony have come from public broadcasters at the federal and provincial levels (most prominently the CBC) as well as political parties on the left and coalitions of subordinate agents. These agents have generally been critical of private sector activity in broadcasting. They have historically included trade unions, educational organizations, community broadcasters and ethnic or other minority groups. These subordinate agents have also included organizations such as the Friends of Canadian Broadcasting, which specifically formed to defend the CBC. However, coalitions supporting the CBC did not emerge during the debates of the mid-to late 1990s; the Friends continued their efforts but failed to establish a bridge to other social movements, artists and groups (Murray, 2001: 32-3) . Such interests must be brought together to support various forms of public broadcasting in the 'digital age'.
The struggle for corporate hegemony in Europe has generally echoed the pattern which took shape earlier in Canada. Since the public broadcasting monopolies were broken up in the 1980s, the emerging dominant agents have included private companies in different areas of broadcasting activity. These agents have employed the discourses of technological determinism and technological democracy in efforts to secure their hegemony. Other dominant agents have included right-ofcentre national governments and the EU, all of which may also reflect the discourses since they pursue agendas which are favourable to corporate interests. Public broadcasters and parties on the left have been joined by various subordinate agents in resisting the direction that broadcasting is moving in (Dahlgren, 2000: 26; Humphreys, 1996: 174-6) . These subordinate agents include various social movements, which Preston (2001: 265) argues are 'the only possible alternative forces' for change in Europe (trade unions, the green/environmental movement, the women's movement and ethnic or minority rights movements, among others). Preston (2001: 269) contends that the common interests shared by such movements 'clearly converge around a radical reorientation of the mature and new digital media trends towards a more pluralist and culturally rich communication order'.
State hegemony
A state project works towards securing the political hegemony of a state. In relation to his concept of a state project, Jessop (1990: 268) indicates that 'any substantive unity which a state system might possess derives from specific political projects and struggles to impose unity or coherence on
that system'. Building on aspects of this concept, efforts to secure the hegemony of a state may be said to entail projects that establish general interests in the control of that state over its institutional components and its territory. Once again, it may be useful to sketch out the key agents in the struggle that has played out on both sides of the Atlantic.
In Canada, several agents are connected to the struggle for state hegemony. The dominant agent has been the federal state. As Charland (1986: 208) indicates, the discourse of technological nationalism has been an aspect of the federal state's efforts to establish 'hegemony over its territory'. However, the federal state and its use of public broadcasting have faced resistance on a number of fronts. Some of this resistance has come from Quebec, which is often described as a nation without a state (Schlesinger, 1991: 298-9) . The province of Quebec has questioned federal control over broadcasting several times since the 1930s (Raboy, 1996: 155-60) , and it has fought since the 1960s for its independence. Along with the sovereignist movement in Quebec, there have been challenges from subordinate agents connected to other regional and cultural interests in Canada. In the 1970s, many regional groups from across the country began to argue against the centralization of the CBC (Raboy, 1990: 228-32) . The tensions deepened as the CBC dealt with budget cuts in the 1980s and 1990s by slashing regional services (Raboy, 1995: 112) .
Compared to Canada, the struggle for state hegemony in Europe is perhaps even more complicated. This is because the dominant agents exist at both the national and supranational levels. While a number of nation-states have historically utilized the discourse of technological nationalism to secure hegemony over their territory, the European Union has more recently utilized a technological supranationalism in its effort 'to move from an integrated market to a political formation, potentially a supranational form of state' (Schlesinger, 2001: 98) . These dominant agents at the national and supranational levels have encountered resistance. Like Canada, some nation-states in Europe have faced resistance from strongly decentralist or even secessionist forces. This is especially the case in Belgium, Spain, Italy and the UK (Schlesinger, 2001: 97) . Schlesinger (2001: 96-7) notes that, 'as nationhood and statehood in Europe do not invariably coincide, the growing salience of the national question offers an inherent challenge to the existing state system'. Furthermore, as in Canada, some nation-states have had to contend with a 'regionalist/localist critique' of public broadcasting. This critique has been concerned with strengthening regional or local identity as opposed to the 'unifying national culture', and it has been associated
with arguments for the decentralization of broadcasting (Syvertsen, 1991: 107) . With regard to the EU's project of forging 'Europeanness' and developing as a form of state organization, Schlesinger (2001: 109) suggests that 'resistance to wider processes of sociocultural homogenization' comes from official languages as well as 'the discourses of national identity (and also passionate regionalism and localism)'.
The discourses in broadcasting policy debates
With an understanding of the key agents in the struggles for hegemony, it is now possible to consider how discourses on communication technologies enter into these struggles. The discourses have three roles in relation to broadcasting policy debates. First, connections that are made between the discourses (and other discourses) work towards establishing hegemony. Second, contradictions within the discourses open up some space for challenging them. Third, in relation to securing hegemony, the discourses provide the basis for compromises.
These theoretical issues will be illustrated with reference to the Canadian and European contexts. Particular reference will be made to the policy formation process that led to Canada's latest piece of broadcasting legislation, the 1991 Broadcasting Act. This process is useful for addressing the theoretical issues since it remains the most recent, comprehensive collection of positions that various groups have taken on broadcasting policy in Canada. The process is also worthy of discussion since it paralleled and even preceded some key changes in Europe. Although considerable attention will be paid to this process, reference will also be made to European policy debates and policy documents as well as later Canadian developments.
Connections between discourses
Hegemony requires connections between discourses. Discourses become linked to each other through articulation. Hall (1988a: 10) notes that 'ideology always consists, internally, of the articulation of different discursive elements'. The economic discourses of dominant agents often feature ties to discourses that have moral components. For example, Hall (1988b: 39) indicates that Thatcherism combined 'the new doctrines of the free market' with 'a return to the old values' such as 'tradition, Englishness, respectability, patriarchalism, family, and nation'. In this way, the discourses come to partially represent subordinate agents. Hall (1988a: 165) 
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but won 'the consent of very substantial sections of the subordinate and dominated classes' because it also represented 'a little bit of everybody'. As the case of Thatcherism indicates, articulation allows the discourses of dominant agents to become universal and reflect general interests. By appropriating and accommodating other discourses, articulation contributes to the ongoing task of securing hegemony. These points can be extended to analysis of discourses on communication technologies.
Technological determinism provides the basis for some connections between the discourses. The discourse of technological determinism is 'empty' in the sense that it has no moral dimensions; it indicates that communication technologies will alter societies, but it makes no value judgements about what constitutes appropriate or desirable forms of social change. However, as has been noted, technological determinism provides the foundation for technological democracy and (occasionally) technological nationalism. These latter discourses have moral elements since they suggest the characteristics of positive social transformation; they indicate that communication technologies can contribute to such things as 'access' and 'choice' (in the case of technological democracy) or 'unity' (in the case of technological nationalism). Particular economic discourses expressed by dominant agents often feature connections to discourses on communication technologies. For example, state intervention which establishes or expands public broadcasting (and aims to enhance the control of a state over its territory) can be justified through technological nationalism. The latter's moral dimensions help to win support among subordinate agents since they tie into general interests. Similarly, the marketization of broadcasting (which expands or deepens the role of private companies) can be justified through technological determinism and technological democracy. Due to its moral components, technological democracy has an especially important part to play. Connections between economic discourses and discourses on communication technologies, which in turn feature connections to general interests, help to establish the hegemony of dominant agents.
This can be illustrated with reference to the issue of a technologyneutral definition of broadcasting in Canadian broadcasting legislation. Such a definition had been advocated by the cable industry during the proceedings on new broadcasting legislation in the late 1980s (Canada, 24 November 1987: 77) . The federal government subsequently placed this type of definition in a broadcasting bill. The minister of communications pointed out at the time that Canada was one of the first countries to proceed with a technology-neutral definition of broadcasting, which had already been introduced in the US and was being contemplated in
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Japan (Canada, 30 August 1988b: 41) . Several years after the 1991 Broadcasting Act was passed, its technology-neutral approach was supported by the IHAC. The IHAC indicated that 'the policy and regulatory regime must be "technology-neutral" '. According to the IHAC, 'it is critical that market forces determine what technology is appropriate for the provision of a particular service. Only in this way can Canadians receive full benefits from the convergence among technologies and industries now occurring in the economy' (Canada, 1997: 13) . The IHAC argued that technologies, in conjunction with 'market forces', would produce 'universal, affordable and equitable access' as well as 'consumer choice' and 'citizens' participation' (Canada, 1997: 42) . A free market discourse was therefore linked to technological democracy and the general interests of Canadians.
These positions and developments are strikingly similar to the ones that emerged in Europe with regard to a technology-neutral regulatory framework. In several ways, the Green Paper on convergence emphasized the combined benefits of technologies and market forces. It pointed out that 'telecommunications liberalisation and global market opening is already bringing substantial benefits to many businesses and consumers, with lower prices, improved customer service and innovative service offerings' (European Commission, 1997: 5). The Green Paper went further and drew upon technological democracy to suggest that 'the new communication services environment will also provide opportunities to enhance the quality of European citizens' lives, by increasing consumer choice, facilitating access to the benefits of the Information Society and promoting cultural diversity' (European Commission, 1997: iii). However, according to the document, 'potential barriers' to the convergence that would bring these wonders included 'regulatory uncertainty resulting from the scope of current definitions' (European Commission, 1997: 16). The Green Paper therefore pointed to the option of regulation being 'technology neutral' (European Commission, 1997: 21). Not surprisingly, given the purported advantages of current developments for businesses and citizens, the public consultations on the Green Paper revealed general agreement that a technology-neutral regulatory framework was required (European Commission, 1998a: 24, 33; European Commission, 1999a) . Building upon the process involving the Green Paper, the European Commission (1999b: 9-10) later specified that one of the principles for regulation of the audiovisual sector in the digital age included an 'aim to be technologically neutral'. Policy discussions about a technology-neutral regulatory approach have clearly echoed the Canadian case by featuring
connections between a free market discourse, technological democracy and the general interests of Europeans.
Contradictions within discourses
The process of securing hegemony may encounter difficulties since contradictions that are associated with the discourses may be identified and form part of a discursive challenge. Hall (1988b: 64) made this clear when discussing a strategy for the Left to defeat Thatcherism. He noted that it is possible 'to identify some weak spots, some contradictions, places where the discourses don't match up, or where there is a disparity between the promises and the delivery'. However, since such contradictions do not always provide 'big political opportunities ', Hall (1988b: 64) notes that the more important task is to develop 'an equally powerful, equally convincing alternative'. Ultimately, as Hall (1988a: 11) points out, 'the only way of genuinely contesting a hegemonic form of politics is to develop a counter hegemonic strategy'. The arguments of dominant agents reveal several types of contradictions in discourses on communication technologies, and these contradictions may help to pave the way for subordinate agents to advance oppositional discourses.
One contradiction, which involves technological determinism, is between the technological and the social aspects of causality. Finlay (1987: 50) points out that, in discussions of communication technologies, those who utilize technological determinism very often turn the discourse on and off as it suits their arguments. For instance, during the debates that preceded Canada's 1991 Broadcasting Act, representatives of the cable industry implied that there were at least four sources of causality. Focusing on communication technologies, the cable industry expressed concern about 'the impact of technological change on cable and the broadcasting system' (Canada, 24 November 1987: 76) . This focus on technological forces stood in contrast to other sources of causality, all of which were based on social forces of one form or another. When it was useful to do so, the cable industry drew attention to the role of regulators and claimed that some aspects of regulation have inhibited technological advancement (Canada, 24 November 1987: 107) . The industry also addressed the role of consumers, arguing that 'distribution technologies will need to make significant changes to accommodate consumer demands for services' (Canada, 24 November 1987: 75) . Finally, when it was politically advantageous to emphasize the impact of cable companies themselves, two firms within the cable industry made explicit reference to their role in research and development pertaining to communication
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technologies (Canada, 5 November 1987: 126; Canada, 21 October 1987: 107-9) . While the inconsistent (and rather convenient) references to technological and social aspects of causality can be seen in statements made during broadcasting policy debates, they are also evident in policy documents such as Europe's Green Paper on convergence. The Green Paper indicated that technological convergence was 'a key driver of current developments in telecommunications, media and information technology industries ' (European Commission, 1997: 15) . However, the document also noted that convergence is affected by social forces. While identifying the purportedly negative impact of 'regulatory barriers' to convergence (European Commission, 1997: 15) , the Green Paper argued that 'consumer demands and needs for better access to information' (European Commission, 1997: 14) as well as 'co-operative research and development activity' (European Commission, 1997: 11) have a positive impact by facilitating convergence.
Another contradiction, which is associated with technological nationalism, entails a tension between democracy and domination. Charland (1986: 204-5) refers to 'the paradoxical promise of democracy and domination inherent to the rhetoric of technological nationalism'. Through public broadcasting in Canada, Charland indicates that technological nationalism 'proposes the electronic polis and affirms no value save the communication of the people's voices. . . . However, this vision of a society in and through technology is undermined by technological nationalism's other goal, that of creating a united Canada.' The discourse of technological nationalism presents public broadcasting as a neutral medium which offers democratic communication while also revealing public broadcasting to be a medium that sustains the power of the centre over the periphery. A similar contradiction is also evident in descriptions of a role for public broadcasting in Europe. With reference to Europe, Collins (1998: 60-1) notes that 'components of public service broadcasting's mandate may sometimes be contradictory'. The role of public broadcasting as 'an emancipator of its audience' is at odds with its role of 'providing a national cultural cement' (Collins, 1998: 58) . These kinds of contradictions have practical implications. For example, in Canada or in those countries of Europe which have secessionist forces, it could be argued that the responsibility of a public broadcaster to reflect the variety of views that exist in the public (including the views of separatists) does not mesh with its responsibility to bind the country together and ensure national unity.
The contradiction between democracy and domination is also associated with technological democracy. As Finlay (1987: 16) sees it, 'the contradiction lies between a content of democratization and a procedure of hierarchical exclusivity'. In discussions about democratic communication, 'active roles' (such as 'subject' and 'sender') usually go to communication technologies or private companies (Finlay, 1987: 89) . The public is often placed in 'passive roles' (including those of 'object' and 'receiver') or even left out altogether (Finlay, 1987: 89, 94) . To the extent that the public is given 'active roles', Finlay (1987: 94-5) notes that this is usually only within the realm of consumption and in relation to hierarchically superior private companies (as when using communication technologies to exercise choice with regard to broadcasting options that are offered). In the arguments of private companies, the discourse of technological democracy grants active roles to communication technologies and frequently denies the public a place in democratic processes. While marginalizing the public, private companies also place themselves in active roles vis-a-vis democratic forms of broadcasting. For example, consider the following remark that representatives of the cable industry made about their community channels during the debates that preceded Canada's 1991 Broadcasting Act: 'The cable industry seized the opportunities that community programming represented to provide a high quality, comprehensive, and much appreciated reflection of community life through the medium of television' (Canada, 18 June 1987: 88) . The cable industry became the explicit, active subject (sender) while the public was the implicit, passive object (receiver) that gratefully acquired what is given. Remarkably, although community groups produced their own community programming, the public was stripped of any active roles or even a presence. Clearly, discussions about democratic forms of broadcasting can ironically be based on the domination of the public by communication technologies or private companies. It is important to note, however, that the discursive contradiction between democracy and domination can also take shape in other ways. For instance, it is apparent in the European Community's principles regarding the information society and its technologies. Golding (1998a: 147) notes 'the essentially contradictory components' of these principles, which value democratic ideas such as 'universal access' and 'equality of opportunity' along with 'private investment' and other ingredients for corporate domination.
Discourses on communication technologies also generate other kinds of contradictions. These involve what Finlay (1987: 62) calls 'double binds'. Finlay indicates that 'the discourses on new communications technology seem to function principally by producing either/or situations where there is no real possibility of making the "right" choice and
yet where the discourse provides a compulsion to do so' (Finlay, 1987: 61) .
One double bind focuses on reflection vs urgency. This takes the form of an opposition between the need to consider new communication technologies carefully, which involves studying the implications of the technologies, and the need to move forward quickly under the propelling influence of the technologies (Finlay, 1987: 62-5) . The IHAC seemed to miss the incompatibility between its three-year analysis of the information highway (as well as its call for additional work) and its emphasis on swift action. According to the IHAC, 'a new knowledge society is replacing the industrial society. . . . It is urgent that Canada move quickly and wisely to accelerate that transition.' The IHAC added that 'this conviction animated the Council's work when it began three years ago. . . . While much has been accomplished, much needs to be done -and urgently' (Canada, 1997: 123) . This double bind has also existed in European policy documents. The Green Paper on convergence warned that 'the issues involved are complex and will require much discussion before any new Community initiatives can be proposed'. However, immediately before making this pronouncement, the Green Paper insisted on the need for Europe to quickly embrace the technological changes: 'If Europe fails to do so, or fails to do so rapidly enough, there are real risks that our businesses and citizens will be left to travel in the slow lane of an information revolution' (European Commission, 1997: 35) .
Another double bind suggests that it is dangerous to adopt the technologies, but it is more dangerous not to adopt them (Finlay, 1987: 65-6 ). This can be illustrated through the remarks of Rogers Communications during the proceedings on Canadian broadcasting legislation in the late 1980s. Due to the American content that enters Canada through communication technologies, Rogers pointed out that the technologies are a 'threat to our sovereignty' (Canada, 4 November 1987: 196) . However, the company also argued that 'we cannot build a wall around this country' to protect it from the impact of the technologies. Consequently, since it was essential to meet 'all the nation's video needs today and tomorrow', Rogers said that 'we will use fibre or whatever other technology is useful for the plant and for the distribution system' (Canada, 4 November 1987: 180-1) . A similar double bind has existed in European discussions of digital broadcasting. The High Level Group on Audiovisual Policy issued the following warning: 'The danger is that the channel proliferation brought about by digital technology will lead to further market fragmentation, making it even more difficult for European producers to compete with American imports.' However, in the next paragraph, the Group insisted that 'there are tremendous opportunities opening up and Europe must seize them or others will simply do so in our place ' (European Commission, 1998b: 6) . This double bind shows how much European arguments have come to resemble age-old Canadian concerns about Americanization. Both the Canadian and European positions imply that the danger of Americanization is great if we adopt the technologies, but they also imply that the danger of not adopting the technologies is greater.
In order to get out of such double binds, Finlay (1987: 67-8 ) notes that it is necessary to identify a third option and thereby move beyond 'the ridiculous either/or position'. For example, instead of adopting all technologies or none of them, it is possible to adopt some but reject others with particular social, cultural and political goals in mind (Babe, 1988: 74) . Dissecting the discourses of dominant agents and identifying a third option provides a way for subordinate agents to make imaginative and compelling contributions to broadcasting policy debates.
Subordinate agents can also move beyond the contradictions within the discourses by advancing the discourses of a counter-hegemony. After exposing the inconsistencies in the arguments of dominant agents, subordinate agents must try to advance a strong set of arguments that are based on social processes and have the aim of achieving democratic principles. To this end, Murray (2001: 40) argues for a 'democratic rights discourse'. Such a discourse would, for example, focus on the right to cultural identity and the right to cultural expression (Murray, 2001: 40) . As Murray (2001: 38) notes, 'progressive social movements are beginning to move new assertions of these rights to the centre of the global arena'.
Compromises involving discourses
Even in an era of globalization, the state still provides a site of struggle between competing discourses. Preston (2001: 265) writes that 'the state remains an important potential conduit through which alternative forces for change or reform may be asserted'. However, these alternative forces are at a disadvantage compared to powerful interests. The latterwhether they are private companies, governments or supranational institutions -have the best opportunity to advance their definition of issues and conditions. As Hall (1988b: 62) indicates, being in this position is crucial since 'other definitions then have to respond to you; it's your definition that is being negotiated'. The discourses of technological
determinism, technological democracy and technological nationalism are significant here. Subordinate agents are forced to confront these discourses, and the discourses are also the terrain on which compromise is reached. Any such compromise is therefore weighted in favour of dominant agents, but it grants concessions to subordinate agents. By striking this kind of compromise, the state works towards securing hegemony. As Hall (1988a: 168-9) explains, 'the state is clearly absolutely central in articulating the different areas of contestation, the different points of antagonism, into a regime of rule'. These points can be illustrated with reference to the discourses of technological nationalism and technological democracy.
Technological nationalism
The debates that led to Canada's 1991 Broadcasting Act illustrate how the discourse of technological nationalism has provided the basis for compromise. During the policy debates, subordinate groups mounted resistance to the discourse due to its focus on achieving national unity and reducing regional or cultural differences. The National Aboriginal Communications Society reflected the position of many cultural and regional groups when it emphasized that 'ours is a task to restructure the Canadian broadcasting system, to go beyond the conceptual approach of technological nationalism and to acknowledge and serve the pluralism of this country' (Canada, 9 March 1987: 7) . The federal government responded to the resistance by modifying the discourse when it introduced a policy paper and a broadcasting bill. The policy paper accommodated regional and cultural interests by suggesting that broadcasting fosters 'national, regional, or ethnic culture' (Canada, 1988a: 5) . The broadcasting bill (and eventually the 1991 Broadcasting Act) made concessions to Quebec by changing the CBC's mandate. A clause in the 1968 Broadcasting Act, which required the CBC to 'contribute to the development of national unity' (Canada, 1967-8: art. 2.g.iv) , was softened to indicate that the CBC had to 'contribute to shared national consciousness' (Canada, 1991: art. 3.1.m.vi) . It was no longer implied that the CBC had to support a particular political arrangement, and the new clause was justified by the minister of communications through reference to general interests in 'freedom of expression' (Canada, 31 January 1990: 11) . Such changes were supported by many subordinate agents. Through connections to the interests of these agents, a shift in the discourse of technological nationalism worked towards establishing the hegemony of the federal state. During the 1990s, this shift deepened. The policy literature now rarely includes language promoting national unity or national conscious-
ness (Murray, 2001: 33) . Instead, it stresses the need to use public broadcasting and the 'information highway' to reflect Canada's 'cultural diversity' (Canada, 1997: 57 ; see also Canada, 1996: 89, 99) . A 'cultural diversity agenda' is now well developed in Canadian policy discourse (McDowell, 2001: 125, 130) .
The discourse of technological nationalism has undergone a similar shift in Europe. It was noted earlier that, much like in Canada, public broadcasting in Europe originally had the objective of fostering national unity and suppressing the cultural identities of various groups. However, as Collins (1998: 62) indicates, 'diversity has increasingly been constituted as the key value in the name of which public service broadcasting is defended'. The deepening focus on cultural diversity has been particularly striking at the supranational level. Although the EU has historically seen cultural diversity as an obstacle to the Europeanization of markets, European policy discourse now regards cultural diversity as a resource for economic development. Consequently, growing emphasis has been placed on the diversity of European countries and the notion that cultural diversity has to be recognized as an essential characteristic of the continent (Skogerbø, 1996: 73; de Moragas Spà et al., 1999: 17, 25) . This is reflected in the discussion of public broadcasting within recent policy documents. The High Level Group wrote that 'public service broadcasting has an important role to play in promoting cultural diversity in each country ' (European Commission, 1998b: 25) . The European Commission (1999b: 12) later expressed this view in its guidelines for audiovisual policy. Harrison and Woods (2001: 481) suggest that the European Community's focus on cultural diversity through public broadcasting aims to 'ensure that minority groups do not feel isolated or disenfranchised from the society in which they live'. To at least some degree, then, the Community's emphasis on cultural diversity may be echoing earlier developments in Canada. Like Canada between the 1960s and the 1980s, Europe of the 1990s saw decentralist and secessionist forces become part of an 'upsurge of nationalist consciousness' (Schlesinger, 2001: 97) . The state in Canada eventually responded to this type of situation by modifying the discourse of technological nationalism to accommodate regional and cultural interests in diversity. A similar reaction may be at play in Europe vis-a-vis technological supranationalism and the EU's project of Europeanization.
Technological democracy In European broadcasting policy debates, the discourse of technological democracy has helped to win support for the interests of dominant agents. This can be illustrated through a study of
radio reform in Finland during the mid-1980s. Hujanen (1997: 48) shows how this reform process was affected by 'the democratic utopia of communication'. The latter 'constructed a vision of a society in which the new media, the new forms of communication technology, would open up a way towards "polis"'. The vision being presented was based on two central concepts, access and participation (Hujanen, 1997: 48) . The discourse of technological democracy was clearly being utilized in the radio reform process, and it was being utilized by private companies that wanted to introduce commercial radio broadcasting. Through the discourse, these companies were able to challenge the monopoly that public radio broadcasting had enjoyed in Finland. The public debate on radio reform worked in the favour of private companies because it became discursively constructed as a choice between 'democratic' and 'authoritarian' models of radio broadcasting rather than a choice between 'commercial radio' and 'public service' (Hujanen, 1997: 53) . This reversed the traditional discursive dichotomy which represented public broadcasting as 'positive' and private broadcasting as 'negative'. Hujanen (1997: 54) notes that 'only the re-articulation of this dichotomy' enabled private companies 'to gain wide popular and political support for their intentions'. Thus, the discourse of technological democracy enabled private companies to make connections to general interests and win support for the growth of private broadcasting.
The debates that led to Canada's 1991 Broadcasting Act took place a few years later, and they show how the discourse of technological democracy can also provide the basis for compromise. The key to this is the discourse's emphasis on access. The issue of access is tied to a dominant definition of communication, which sees communication as an object that must be equitably distributed (Finlay, 1987: 36) . Cable companies had long utilized technological democracy, stressing that cable provides access through community channels. During the policy debates on new broadcasting legislation, cable companies also suggested that their control over community channels was in the interests of community broadcasters and the consumers of cable services (Canada, 26 May 1987: 76; Canada, 20 October 1987: 10) . Community broadcasters responded by adopting certain elements of technological democracy and altering others; they accepted the focus on access but rejected the notion that it was simply technology driven. Instead, community broadcasters stressed the social barriers to access which stemmed from the control that cable companies held over community channels. They called for a 'right of access' and measures to give community broadcasters control over the channels so that access could be assured. They also called for community broadcasting to be given a place in broadcasting legislation alongside public broadcasting and private broadcasting since it provided the access which the other two forms of broadcasting could less readily offer (Canada, 19 March 1987: 28, 31-2) . The resulting legislation made a concession to community broadcasters on the terrain of technological democracy; their persistent arguments about access as a distinguishing feature of community broadcasting contributed to the eventual inclusion of community broadcasting in the 1991 Broadcasting Act. However, in part due to the discourse of technological democracy and the cable industry's representation of its particular interests in control as general interests, community broadcasters were not given a 'right of access' or the opportunity to control community channels. The concession that was made to community broadcasters, combined with the connection that cable companies made to general interests, contributed to the process of securing the hegemony of private capital in broadcasting.
In both Canada and Europe, the emphasis which dominant agents have placed on the issue of access suggests that the discourse of technological democracy is also providing the basis for compromise over policy connected to the 'information society'. Perhaps because the membership of the IHAC included representatives of private companies, its report stressed their interests in the issue of access: 'Widespread public access to the Internet at the individual, institutional and community level is a precondition for producing a healthy consumer market for commercial products and services and for sustaining the viability of a business environment on the Internet' (Canada, 1997: 40) . The need for such access was also stressed by the Internet industry and telecommunications operators during public consultations pertaining to the Green Paper on convergence (European Commission, 1998a: 31) . On both sides of the Atlantic, the commercial interests behind the focus on access have been attached to general interests through an emphasis on the democratic potential of communication and information technologies. The IHAC stated that 'access to Information Highway services may well become critical to full participation and, indeed, the exercise of democratic citizenship in a knowledge society' (Canada, 1997: 55) . As noted earlier, the Green Paper on convergence claimed that 'the new communication services environment' makes it possible 'to enhance the quality of European citizens' lives' in part by 'facilitating access to the benefits of the Information Society' (European Commission, 1997: iii) .
Subordinate agents have responded on the terrain of the dominant discourse by pressing for access to the 'information highway'. In Canada, public consultations revealed the concerns that Francophones, aboriginal peoples and the disabled had about such access (Canada, 1995: 3, 44) . Consumers' organizations and community broadcasters were among the groups that addressed the issue of access during public consultations in Europe (European Commission, 1998a: 26, 32) . The issue of access is also part of the democratic rights discourse that has been adopted by social movements. Murray (2001: 38) notes that some of these rights are 'instrumental' and focus on 'providing the informational tools, education, or capacity to function as a cultural citizen, or guaranteeing access to basic cultural resources'.
Subordinate agents must move beyond the issue of access and not be trapped into resisting on the terrain of the dominant discourse. Although access is an important issue in relation to the 'information society' (Golding, 1998b: 16; McQuail, 1998: 224) , it does not cut to the core of communicational inequalities. Even if there is access, communication may be limited. Dominant agents have the opportunity to restrict what subordinate agents can say through old and new media, as cable companies did with community channels (Goldberg, 1990: 58) or as service providers are doing in relation to the Internet (Winseck, 2002: 334) . In order to avoid arguing on the terrain of a dominant definition of communication, which reduces communication to the status of an object, it is useful for subordinate agents to adopt an alternative definition. Finlay (1987: 250) suggests that it is possible 'to consider communication as an activity or a practice rather than as an object'. Due to the problematic elements of a focus on access, the democratic rights discourse adopted by subordinate agents must also focus on other kinds of rights. Finlay (1987: 251) argues that 'communication rights must shift away from the question of access to objects and towards the right to practice certain discursive procedures'. The 'right to access' must be accompanied by the 'right to communicate'. The latter is a notion that was introduced by Jean d'Arcy in the 1960s (Finlay, 1987: 251, 266 ), but it retains support and relevance in the 'digital age ' (de Bens and Mazzoleni, 1998: 177; Vittachi, 1998) . All of this indicates the need to call for 'expressive rights' (those that involve guaranteeing freedom of expression) as well as other cultural rights within a democratic rights discourse (Murray, 2001: 38) . This is the task of subordinate agents in Europe, Canada and elsewhere.
Conclusion
This article has examined issues connected to broadcasting policy in Canada and Europe, including the role of discourses on communication to consider the role of subordinate agents; the model highlights the contradictions and the compromises which are crucial to struggles involving discourses on communication technologies. Such issues must be addressed in order to keep the focus of analysis on opposition, conflict and the potential for change.
